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Following the Government’s widely-predicted victory in Parliament’s 
vote of confidence last night, Theresa May sought (at least 
rhetorically) to reach out to MPs in other parties, arguing that MPs 
have made very clear what they don’t want and now need to make 
clear what they do. In light of this, we thought we’d consider the likely 
positions of each party and the political positions underlying some of 
the rhetoric, including that on the part of the Government. It is clear 
that, as things stand, the proposed Withdrawal Agreement has been 
strongly rejected and there is insufficient desire to force a change of 
government or General Election. 
Theresa May has already help initial discussions with leaders of most 
opposition parties, as well as her partners the DUP. Crucially, 
however, this so far has not included the leader of the Official 
Opposition, Jeremy Corbyn, who has refused to meet with the Prime 
Minister unless she explicitly rules out a “no deal” scenario. Whether 
one agrees with him or not, from a political perspective this is an 
extremely shrewd move. 
Corbyn faces a challenge: he is notably more Eurosceptic than his 
party, both in terms of the membership and in terms of the 
parliamentary party. A majority of Labour members and politicians 
(especially MPs) are generally pro-European and are certainly 
vociferously anti-Brexit.  Moreover, surveys suggest that a majority of 
present Labour voters are opposed to leaving the EU. However, a 
majority of Labour MPs represent constituencies in which a majority 
voted Leave in 2016 and a substantial minority of present and 
potential Labour voters believe that the UK should leave the EU 
(whatever disagreements may be had over the terms of this). 
The Labour Party’s official position is therefore that it “respects” the 
result of the 2016 referendum (and therefore supports leaving the 
EU), but wants a permanent customs union with the EU[1] and close 
alignment with the Single Market. At the same time, they anticipate 
the end of Freedom of Movement and want the ability to derogate 
from the EU’s state aid rules. Moreover, the UK would apparently be 
given a substantial voice over any future free trade deals struck by the 
EU. Suffice it to say that, in Brussels and elsewhere, this wish list is 
likely to look an awful lot like having and eating a deluxe gateau with 
cherries on it. 
Nevertheless, being out of government during the Article 50 
negotiations means that this need not be a problem. It is, after all, 
quite legitimate to argue that Labour cannot know what concessions it 
would need to make in negotiations, or what alternative outcomes it 
might be able to engender were it in government instead of the 
Conservative Party. It is clear from the Labour Party conference that 
members (and most Labour MPs) would support a second 
referendum in preference to any of the other alternatives presently on 
offer, although an alternative such as membership of the Single 
Market and EU Customs Union might be acceptable. 
REPORT THIS ADPRIVACY SETTINGS 
Taking part in talks (and certainly facilitating any concrete agreement) 
is therefore politically extremely risky for Corbyn. In a country so 
deeply divided, any Brexit outcome will bitterly disappoint a large 
number. Moreover, given Corbyn’s comparative Euroscepticism, there 
is a distinct risk that his personal views clash with his party’s and 
cause a public rift. Corbyn’s present strategy neatly gets around all of 
these problems, whilst maximising his chances of winning the next 
election. If he were to refuse point-blank to negotiate with Theresa 
May, he would appear to be putting partisan interests above those he 
seeks to serve, coveting only the keys to 10 Downing Street. By 
placing an apparently legitimate pre-condition on talks, he avoids this. 
Given their feelings around Brexit, ruling out a ‘no-deal’ scenario 
outright appeals to both the Parliamentary Labour Party and the 
membership at large. It’s also a position supported by a very large 
majority of Labour voters. 
It is difficult to see how the Prime Minister, Theresa May, could accept 
this precondition. After all, the UK had little leverage in any 
negotiations with the EU to begin with. If ‘no-deal’ is ruled out a 
priori then the Prime Minister gives up any remaining leverage she 
might have had. If the other party in a negotiation knows that you are 
unable to walk away then you have little choice but to accept their 
terms, whatever those might be. Similarly, ruling out ‘no-deal’ would 
be anathema to many Conservative MPs, and would cause concern 
amongst the DUP. 
Corbyn thus avoids becoming ‘tainted’ by Brexit. Whatever deal is 
agreed, he need not be associated with it. Finally, in terms of winning 
power, the optimal political strategy is for the Conservative Party to 
fail to ratify a deal and thus deliver a ‘no-deal’ Brexit by default. The 
result would not only cause economic damage but would also have 
the added advantage of, at a minimum, causing high profile 
resignations from the Conservative Party and, potentially a debilitating 
split. By failing to engage with the Prime Minister, this outcome is 
rendered more likely. It is clear that the governing Conservative Party 
is too split to agree on ratifying any feasible withdrawal agreement 
without opposition support. 
Only were Theresa May to pivot towards an extremely soft Brexit 
(what has been termed BINO, or Brexit in Name Only) might Corbyn 
come under pressure to accede to this. Were she to do so however, 
then in the words of one Eurosceptic Conservative MP “she’s toast”[2]. 
In essence, therefore, Corbyn’s manoeuvre has left Theresa May 
between a rock and a hard place. The danger for him is that individual 
Labour MPs become so concerned about the situation that they take 
the situation into their own hands and negotiate individually with the 
Government. A second danger is that Theresa May does, indeed, 
commit effective hara-kiri by pivoting abruptly towards a soft Brexit. A 
catastrophic loss of confidence on the part of some of her own MPs 
could then ‘bounce’ Corbyn into calling (and winning) a vote of no-
confidence, and leave him in the unenviable position of holding the 
Brexit baby. 
REPORT THIS ADPRIVACY SETTINGS 
The position of the Scottish National Party and the Liberal Democrats 
with respect to Brexit are outwardly rather similar. Both profess to 
desire a second referendum on EU membership, although the former 
also supports a Single Market plus Customs Union solution. Both are 
likely to be very challenging on a personal level for Theresa May, who 
has interpreted the result of the referendum as a desire both to end 
freedom of movement of labour and to repatriate policymaking to 
Westminster. Such a volte-face would also be professionally difficult, 
and would not command the support of a substantial number of 
Conservative MPs, rendering them difficult to get through the 
Commons. 
Indeed, the primary long-term political objective for the SNP is in 
securing independence for Scotland and its Brexit policy must be 
seen through this lens (however heartfelt its Europhilia might be). 
Brexit is extremely unpopular within Scotland, and many would view a 
hard Brexit as being sufficient to warrant a second referendum on 
independence. Moreover, one of the arguments deployed by unionists 
– that Scotland would need to reapply for EU membership – would be 
gone, and Scotland would have adopted an extremely unpopular 
policy on the basis of votes elsewhere in the United Kingdom. Suffice 
it to say, whilst political considerations force the SNP to oppose a 
hard Brexit in public, they cannot be oblivious to the opportunities it 
would present them. 
The above demonstrates just what a tangled web is weaved in British 
politics today. It is hardly a revelation that the British (and Irish!) public 
are bewildered and unimpressed by the Machiavellian manoeuvrings 
of our politicians. Nevertheless, these are the incentives that the 
political system has put in front of politicians. As such, one cannot be 
surprised that an overwhelming majority of the public want to see a 
root and branch reform of the political system[3]. 
1. Starmer, K., We need a new and credible approach to Brexit. 
2018: Speech at the EEF Technology Hub. 
2. Barker, A. and J. Pickard, Could the customs union help 
Theresa May break Brexit deadlock? , in Financial Times. 2019: 
London. 
3. ComRes. Daily Express Voting Intention and Brexit Poll, January 
2019. 2019; Available 
from: https://www.comresglobal.com/polls/daily-express-voting-
intention-and-brexit-poll-january-2019/. 
 
